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1 Cf. other similar definitions of Austrian and Austro-German philosophy in Haller (1979), Simons (2000), 
Smith (1981, 1989, 1994, 1996), and Mulligan (1989, 1990, 1997, 2001, 2012). 
2 On his philosophical appreciation of Austria, see for instance his inaugural lecture “On the Causes of 
Discouragement in the Philosophical Domain”, in Brentano (1929, pp. 85ff). See also his recollections in his 
letter to Bergman from 1909, published in Bergman (1946, p. 125). On his project to found a school as such, see 
Brentano (1895, p. 34), Husserl (1919/1976, pp. 156ff/48ff), and Fisette and Fréchette (2007, pp. 14ff) for 
further sources. 
3 See Baumgartner (2003). 
4 Ryle (1976). 
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Aristotle’s	Heir	Brentano’s	interest	in	philosophy	was	doubtless	largely	conditioned	by	the	great	philosophical	and	literary	talents	in	his	family,	and	its	role	in	the	development	of	German	Romanticism.	His	uncle	Clemens	Brentano	and	his	aunt	Bettina	von	Arnim	marked	the	history	of	German	Romanticism,	and	are	among	the	direct	successors	of	Goethe	and	the	Weimarer	Klassik.	His	father,	Christian	Brentano,	was	well	known	as	a	Catholic	writer.	He	took	a	great	interest	in	philosophy,	and	was	instrumental	in	publishing	the	Nachlass	of	his	brother	Clemens.	He	supposedly	attended	Schelling’s	first	lectures	in	Jena,	which	left	him	with	a	terrible	impression.5		The	young	Franz	started	his	studies	in	Munich	in	1856,	under	the	supervision	of	Ernst	von	Lasaulx,	who	was	also	a	friend	of	his	uncle	and	on	whom	he	had	previously	made	a	very	good	impression.6	He	spent	two	years	in	Munich,	after	which	he	went	to	Berlin	to	study	Aristotle	under	the	supervision	of	Trendelenburg.	Later,	Brentano	would	write	that	he	did	not	always	consider	Trendelenburg’s	method	of	closely	studying	text	appropriate,	and	that	it	was	in	fact	Aquinas	who	was	his	foremost	guide	to	Aristotelian	philosophy.7	In	Münster,	he	spent	an	academic	year	working	under	the	supervision	of	Franz	Jakob	Clemens	and	Christoph	Bernhard	Schlüter,	who	not	only	trained	him	in	medieval	philosophy,	but	also	introduced	him	to	Neo-Scholasticism.8																																																									
5 See his biography in Christian Brentano (1854, XIV). 
6 From Lasaulx’s correspondence as quoted in Stöltzle (1904, p. 231): “Franz is in fact a subtle man, whom I like 
very much“ (“Franz ist in der Tat ein feinsinniger Mensch, der mir sehr wohl gefällt.”)  
7 See his letter to Hugo Bergman of January 22, 1908, published in Bergman (1946, p. 106). “I am far from 
denying that he [Trendelenburg] was once my master. It was indeed he who guided me to Aristotle. And as I was 
attending his lectures on Aristotle, I compared in the library the commentaries of the great schoolman [Aquinas] 
and found there some passages favorably explained, which Trendelenburg was not able to make 
comprehensible.” See also Brentano’s letter to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1914: “With Trendelenburg, 
I shared all my life the conviction that philosophy is capable of a truly scientific approach, but that it is 
incompatible with such an approach when, without any reverence toward the ideas transmitted by the great 
thinkers of earlier times, it aims to insert them anew in every head. Therefore, I followed his example when I 
dedicated some years of my life to the study of the works of Aristotle, which he taught me to consider as an 
unexploited treasure trove. The same conviction that there are no prospects for true success in philosophy when 
one does not proceed as in other scientific disciplines brought me to the conviction not to embrace everything at 
the outset, but rather to concentrate my whole energy on a few relatively simple tasks, as did Archimedes, 
Galilei, and according to his own report, Newton, who allegedly compared his work with that of a child fishing 
out a few shells from the sea. Here, not only does the old saying that the half is greater than the whole obtain, as 
it seems to me: even for a minuscule part, one can say that it is better to tackle it than wanting to embrace the 
whole for then, in reality, one embraces nothing.” Letter quoted in Oberkofler (1989:IXf.) Husserl famously 
adapted Brentano’s motto using a monetary metaphor: “Not always the big bills, gentlemen: small change, small 
change!” quoted in Gadamer (1987, p. 107). 
8 Brentano’s third habilitation thesis (see Brentano 1866/1929, p. 137) was partly inspired by Clemens, who 
published a well-known book (Clemens 1856) on philosophy as a servant to theology. For some time, Brentano 
first planned to write his dissertation on Suarez under the supervision of Clemens, who was famous for his 
scholarship on Suarez. First drafts of this dissertation are deposited in Brentano’s Nachlass at the Houghton 




9 On this, see the correspondence between Mach and Trendelenburg published in Thiele (1978, p. 205). 
10 On these dates, see Stumpf (1922, p. 29). 
11 On Clemens as the main German representative of Neo-Scholasticism, see Stöckl (1870, p. 836). 
12 On Lasaulx’s cyclical Verfallsgeschichte, see Schnabel (1937, p. 168) and in particular Schoeps 




13 See Stumpf (1919/1976, p. 103/19). 
14 See Fels (1926/27), Utitz (1954, p. 77), Hertling (1919, pp. 208ff), Freudenberger (1969, pp. 148ff), Fisette 
and Fréchette (2007, pp. 25ff)  
15 See Stumpf (1922, p. 71). 




17 Even before the first book was published on Easter 1874, Brentano wrote to Lotze about his doubts on the 
project. Years later, in a diary entry from 1904, he detailed the motives of his decision not to continue the project 
on the basis of his view that psychology was not yet ready at that time for such comprehensive works. See 
Falckenberg (1901, p. 112) Fréchette (2012, pp. 104ff), and Rollinger (2012, p. 301). 






19 See for example Anonymous (1894, 1894a, 1895). 





21 See Husserl (1919, p. 155/1976, p. 48).  
22 According to Spiegelberg (1981, pp. 119-122) the painting was destroyed in the bombing of Antwerp in 1940.  
23 On April 8, 1886, Brentano wrote to Marty: “Dr. Husserl and Hillebrand are thinking about going to Prague 
this summer. Unfortunately, I could not tell them what you plan to lecture on.” On October 22, 1886, he wrote 
again to Marty: “Husserl has now left for Halle. I recommended him to Stumpf with the reserves that seemed 






24 Husserl announced the discovery in a rather discreet manner, as a footnote in the second edition of the Logical 
Investigations (Husserl 2001, p. 353). On Husserl’s discovery of the self, see Fréchette (2013a). 
25 On the reactions of the Brentanians, see for instance Kraus (1931, p. 140) and Stumpf (1930). Carnap 
(1931, pp. 230-1) and Ryle (1931, pp. 230-1), who were otherwise both sympathetic to some aspects of early 
phenomenology, also noticed the change of perspective. 
26 Contrary to the work that it prefigures, there has been little study of the inner structure of Brentano (1866). 
Kraus categorized the themes of the theses: methodology, ontology and metaphysics, continuity, psychology, 	
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isolate	five	general	principles	among	them,	which	can	serve	here	as	a	guide	to	Brentano’s	conception	of	philosophy:			
five	general	principles	form	Brentano’s	philosophy	a) Philosophy	is	a	science:	philosophy	should	be	practiced	as	a	science	in	the	unitary	sense	of	the	term,	which	excludes	a	distinction	between	speculative	and	exact	sciences,	and	which	means	using	the	same	methods	as	the	natural	sciences	(see	theses	1	and	4);		b) Anti-Kantianism:	Kantianism,	including	its	views	on	the	proofs	of	the	existence	of	God,	is	false	(see	theses	1,	6,	7);		c) Empiricism:	philosophy	starts	from	experience	(see	theses	12,	13,	14,	15);	d) The	mereological	nature	of	substance:	the	accident	contains	its	substance;	there	are	ultimate	specific	determinations	of	the	substance,	but	since	we	do	not	have	an	intuition	of	an	individual	substance	in	all	its	determinations	–	we	only	have	intuitions	of	an	individual	substance	through	the	accidents	given	in	intuitive	perception	–	we	cannot	properly	know	it27	(see	theses	16,	17).	e) Correctness	principle:	something	has	value	just	when	it	is	correct	to	love	it;	a	judgment	is	true	just	when	it	is	correct	to	acknowledge	(anerkennen)	the	existence	of	its	object	(see	theses	24,	25).28		Further	principles	of	Brentano’s	philosophy,	which	are	formulated	in	the	25	habilitation	theses,	also	played	an	important	role	in	his	intellectual	development,	although	for	various	reasons	they	do	not	share	the	privileged	position	of	the	five	basic	principles	in	his	system:			
																																																																																																																																																																													
philosophy of language, freedom of the will, ethics, and aesthetics (Brentano 1929, p. 165). Detailed discussions 
of some of the theses can be found in Gilson (1955), Ingarden (1969), and Sauer (2000). 
27 The idea behind theses 16 and 17 is that the accident contains the substance and, analogously, that our 
concepts (e.g., the concept of redness) contain in themselves the intuition of something red. Like accidents, 
concepts are one-sidedly detachable from the intuition at their base (resp. from substance). See the quote in 
Chrudzimski (2004, p. 142). Thesis 16 is about the logical parts of a whole, which stand in a line of predication 
and which constitute, as a whole, the individual of a kind. Thesis 17 is about the metaphysical parts of a whole: 
every metaphysical part is different. 
28 Cf. also Brentano (1889/1902, p. 17/15f). 
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f) Metaphysical	continuism:	space	is	a	finite,	non-empty	continuum	(theses	8,	9,	10);	g) Linguistic	empiricism:	language	was	developed	as	an	auxiliary	tool	for	thought	(theses	18,	19).		This	is	a	corollary	of	principle	(c).		h) Logical	reductionism:	Some	judgments,	like	disjunctive	judgments,	are	simply	linguistic	formulations	of	other,	more	fundamental,	forms	of	judgments	(theses	20,	21);	i) Indeterminism	is	not	a	challenge	to	free	will	(thesis	23);29	j) Philosophy	should	not	be	considered	a	servant	to	theology,	although	theology	might	sometimes	serve	as	a	guiding	star30	(theses	2	and	3).			Among	the	various	reasons	why	principles	(f)	to	(j)	do	not	count	as	basic	principles,	it	may	be	helpful	to	stress	a	few	in	particular:	changes	in	Brentano’s	views	at	different	stages	of	his	development	(e.g.,	principle	i);	insights	that	would	be	substantially	developed	only	later	(e.g.,	principle	h);	the	limited	application	of	certain	insights	to	a	specific	domain	of	philosophy	(principles	f	and	g);	and	having	metaphilosophical	significance	chiefly	outside	philosophy,	and	therefore	not	being	directly	relevant	as	a	
philosophical	principle	(principle	j).		 Some	of	these	five	general	principles	are	deliberately	formulated	here	so	as	to	be	interpretable	in	more	than	one	way,	for	two	reasons.	First,	there	is	no	documentation,	besides	cryptic	marginal	notes	by	Brentano	himself,	on	how	he	actually	defended	the	theses	during	his	disputatio.	Second,	and	consequently,	Brentano’s	later	philosophy	must	be	used	to	substantiate	the	principles.	Since	he	changed	his	mind	more	than	once	on	many	philosophical	matters,	the	five	general	principles	are	illustrated	differently	depending	on	the	particular	view	discussed.	 		
Principle	(a):	Philosophy	as	a	science																																																									
29 This position differs from Brentano’s later compatibilist position on free will, from the 1870s onwards, for 
instance in Grundlage der Ethik, where he rejects indeterminism and argues for a compatibilist account. Kraus 
argues in Brentano (1929, p. 180) that the early Brentano was an indeterminist, but besides principle (i) and a 
small remark by Stumpf (1919, p. 106/1976, p. 21) there is no clear evidence that he has been an indeterminist in 
his early years.  
30 On the guiding star (stellae rectrices), see Werle (1989, p. 134) and Sauer (2000, p. 128).  On the guidance of 
theology, see particularly Brentano’s teacher Clemens (1859, p. 15ff), on the “guidance of theology.” The 
rejection of papal infallibility expressed in 1869 (reproduced in Freudenberger 1969) seems to articulate a clean 
break with this idea behind principle (j). For an alternative reading of the connection of principle (j) to the core 
principle (a), see Brandl (forthcoming).  
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According	to	principle	(a),	philosophy	must	oppose	the	distinction	between	exact	and	speculative	sciences,	since	this	opposition	is	its	condition	of	existence	(thesis	1)	and	the	methods	of	philosophy	are	none	other	than	the	methods	of	the	natural	sciences	(thesis	4).	The	first	thesis	was	directed	among	other	things	against	speculative	idealistic	projects	like	that	of	Schelling;31	but	it	was	equally	directed	against	a	restricted	understanding	of	the	“exact”	sciences	as	consisting	only	of	studies	involving	quantitative	measurements.32	Brentano’s	ideal	of	philosophy	as	a	science	combines	the	idea	that	there	is	a	sense	of		“speculation”	according	to	which	metaphysics	is	a	speculative,	and	yet	exact,	enterprise	–	even	more	so	than	“exact	physics”	(in	a	sense	i	akin	to	Comte’s	positive	method	a	positive	speculation)33	–	with	the	idea	that	true	science	must	also	allow	for	this	kind	of	“speculative	exactness,”	and	not	only	for	the	kind	of	exactness	required	by	quantitative	measurements.		 Given	this	reading	of	thesis	1,	it	is	easier	to	understand	the	sense	in	which	Brentano	considers	that	philosophy	be	understood	as	a	science,	and	his	claim	that	it	shares	its	methods	with	natural	sciences.	Like	the	natural	sciences,	philosophy	uses	methods	such	as	observation,	deduction,	and	induction,	insofar	as	they	are	applicable	to	the	objects	of	their	investigation.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	all	philosophical	investigations	should	be	conducted	with	the	methods	of	the	natural	sciences,	which	would	amount	to	naturalism.	Rather,	as	suggested	in	thesis	1,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	philosophical	investigations	can	be	speculative	and	yet	exact	and	scientific	in	the	true	sense.34	Principle	(a)	therefore	allows	for	a	unitary	sense	of	science	by	virtue	of	the	identity	of	methods	between	philosophy	and	natural	sciences	(insofar	as	they	deal	with	the	same	objects,	i.e.,	physical	phenomena),	while	leaving	room	for	a	kind	of	exactness	in	philosophy	which	makes	it	scientific	in	a	broader	sense	than	that	implied	by	the	strict	commonality	of	methods	referred	to	in	thesis	4.35																																																											
31 In particular, it is directed against Schelling’s view that philosophy should cut itself off from all domains of 
“ordinary knowledge” (gemeines Wissen), as programmatically announced in the first issue of his New Journal 
for Speculative Physics (Schelling 1802, p. 34; 1859, p. 262). This passage has often been quoted in the school 
of Brentano as the example par excellence of the dangers of speculative idealism in philosophy. See Brentano 
(1929, p. 104) or Stumpf (1908, p. 17).  
32 See Brentano (1987, p. 6) and Oberkofler (1989:5). 
33 See Brentano (1968:127) and (Sauer 2000, p. 124) 
34 See Brentano (1987:303) 
35 See also Haller (1993) for a similar reading, which makes it possible to draw a direct connection between 
Brentano’s fourth thesis and the Vienna Circle’s project of a unitary science. In his introduction to the 
philosophy of sciences that is much influenced by the Vienna circle, Richard von Mises (1939/1956) quotes 




36 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (B: 651-658). 
37 See Brentano (1968, p. 86) and Hoppenstedt (1933:64). 





39 See Brentano (1926/1998, p. 26/99). 
40 Brentano (1926, p. 22) 
41 In Brentano (1925). 
42 Quoted and translated in Baumgartner (2013, p. 233). 
		 15	
1) axioms,	which	include	tautologies,	universal	predications	(e.g.,	“red	is	a	color”),	predications	of	a	basis	for	some	being	(e.g.,	“everything	which	is	colored	is	extended”),	the	truth	of	a	correlative	(e.g.,	“if	a	is	bigger	than	b,	then	b	is	smaller	than	a”),	mereological	truths	(e.g.,	“if	a	lion	exists,	then	the	heart	of	a	lion	exists”,	or	“if	there	is	a	body,	there	is	a	surface”),	the	determinateness	of	that	which	is	incompletely	presented	(e.g.,	“a	color	is	either	red,	blue,	white,	etc.”),	essential	relations	(e.g.,	“10	metres	is	twice	as	long	as	5	metres”),	the	necessity	of	a	position,	form,	or	ordering	in	a	continuum	(e.g.,	“3	p.m.	is	earlier	than	4	p.m.),	and	double	negation.43	2) Inner	perceivings	(e.g.,	the	knowledge	that	I	am	presently	hearing	(when	I	do),	the	knowledge	that	I	want	to	sleep	(when	I	do),	etc.).	Metaphysics	is	not	only	based	on	immediate	evident	knowledge,	but	also	on	mediate	(and	thus	only	probable)	knowledge,	which	is	obtained	through	induction	from	repeated	observations.	This	kind	of	knowledge	is	what	Brentano	calls	a	“physical	certainty”	of	what	is	given	in	external	perception.	Being	built	on	these	two	sources	of	immediate	evident	knowledge	and	on	the	“physical	certainty”	of	mediate	knowledge	of	outer	perception	secures	the	empirical	grounds	of	metaphysics.	Of	course,	physical	certainty	is	not	evidence:	this	is	why	the	beings	Brentano	investigates	are	not	simply	the	table	out	there,	and	also	not	the	“things	heard”	or	the	“things	seen,”	but	rather	the	“hearer-of-a-tone”	or	the	“seer-of-a-bird.”	Only	in	this	form	are	substances	accessible	to	inner	perception.44			 The	second	domain	of	application	of	principle	(c)	is	psychology	per	se.	For	Brentano,	psychology	relies	on	the	same	two	sources	of	knowledge	as	metaphysics:	“physical	certainty”	obtained	by	induction	from	observation	via	outer	perception,	and	evident	knowledge,	based	either	on	inner	perception	or	on	the	self-evidence	of	axioms.	Psychology	is	therefore	an	empirical	science	with	respect	to	the	laws	of	succession	between	phenomena,	the	explanation	of	their	causes,	and	the	prediction	of	further	phenomena	–	which	are	laws	obtained	by	induction	–	but	also	regarding	innerly		perceived	phenomena,	which	are	subject	to	self-evident	laws.		
Principle	(d):	The	mereological	nature	of	substance																																																									
43 See Brentano (1867b: 31766). 






45 Brentano relies here on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1003b6-10. 
46 On this interpretation of Brentano’s reading of Aristotle’s homonymic conception of being as substance, see 
for instance Owen (1960) and Shields (1999:217ff). 
47 The same idea is discussed in Brentano’s first project of a PhD dissertation on Suarez from the early 1860s. 
See Brentano (frühe Schriften: 1000054)). 





49 Brentano (1889/1902, p. 19-20/18). 
50 On Brentano’s orthonomy view, see Kraus (1937, pp. 165ff) and Mulligan (forthcoming). 
51 On Brentano’s theory of judgment, see Brandl (2014). 
52 On Brentano’s worldview, see Fréchette (forthcoming-a). On Brentano’s philosophical system, see Kriegel 
(forthcoming). 
53 See Masaryk’s notes on Brentano’s metaphysics lectures in Masaryk (1877/78), where phenomenology is 





54 Brentano had an annotated copy of the History of Inductive Sciences in his library, as well Mill’s book on 
Comte (Mill 1868) in a French translation.  
55 See for instance Brentano (EL75, 12921–12), where the distinction between descriptive (beschreibende) and 
causal (nach Wirkungen) sciences. This distinction also played a central role in Schlöder (1852), another work 
that the young Brentano received as a prize and annotated. The distinction between the science of objects and the 
science of phenomena is discussed in Schlöder (1852, xxv); Brentano refers to it in the aforementioned 
manuscript.  




57 See Brentano (1867a: 31739): “When it is formulated in general, the question of the existence of realities 
belongs to ontology. If we would call everything that is not intentional an external thing, the question of the 
existence of external things would be the first question of ontology. But this is not the usage. We do not use to 
call our own mental phenomena in this way... The question about what is real is thereby already partially 
answered. The existence of phenomena of inner perception, and thereby the existence of their parts, in particular 
of the logical and metaphysical parts“. 




59 Husserl’s concept of experience is in some way similar to Dretske’s “non-epistemic seeing” (Dretske 1969), 
since these two concepts describe a level of sensory experience which doesn’t involve conceptual structure. 
However, contra Dretske, Husserl rejects the idea that epistemic seeing is only a“seeing that”. 





61 Husserl had a large collection of lecture notes from Brentano’s lectures, which he donated to the Brentano 
Society in Prague in 1930. These were obviously destroyed during the war since no traces of them are left. A 
fragment of Husserl’s lecture notes on the 1887 descriptive psychology lectures (copied from the notes of 
Schmidkunz) does give evidence of the Brentanian origin of Erlebnis and Erlebte: “When I say that descriptive 
psychology describes what is experienced in immediate experience (das in unmittelbar Erfahrung Erlebte), I am 
not talking about an enumeration of individual cases, but about what is generally characteristic about the 
elements that remain while the composition changes.” On “experiencing”, see also Brentano (1982/1995). 






63 Husserl (1891/2003, p. VII/6): “I have made sparse use of philosophical terminology, which is rather 










64 See also 1901/2001a: pp. 6/166, 129/249, 201/296; 1901/2001: pp. 401/106, 413/113, 729/317, 732/319. 








cream	is	intentional	and	if	intentional	objects	are	contained	in	the	act,	it	seems	that	I	cannot	reasonably	desire	an	ice	cream	if	the	ice	cream	is	already	‘contained’	in	my	act.		 It	has	been	usual	since	Chisholm	(1957,	p.	169)	to	consider	these	two	appellations	as	expressions	of	one	and	the	same	feature.	On	Chisholm’s	reading,	Brentano	is	committed	to	the	view	that	intentional	objects	are	some	kind	of	intra-mental	entities	enjoying	some	diminished	kind	of	existence.		In	this	case,	my	desiring	an	ice	cream	has	an	intentional	object,	the	“ice	cream	represented	and	desired,”	which	is	distinct	from	the	dairy	product	that	I	may	subsequently	enjoy.66		 It	is	questionable,	however,	whether	the	account	of	Brentano’s	concept	of	intentionality	that	Chisholm	sketches	is	a	faithful	reconstruction	of	Brentano’s	ideas	about	intentionality.	To	be	sure,	Brentano	himself	is	not	very	careful	in	his	description	of	intentionality	in	the	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	(1874/2015,	p.	106/92-93),	where	“content”	and	“object”	are	used	interchangeably.	This	may	be	explained	in	many	ways.	Perhaps	the	most	important	to	mention	is	that	the	ontology	of	intentionality	is	not	Brentano’s	primary	concern	in	the	Psychology:	he	focuses	instead	on	the	dualism	of	the	mental	and	the	physical	that	intentionality	grounds,	and	with	the	task	of	psychology	as	a	science	of	phenomena.	In	the	latter	case,	it	indeed	makes	no	important	difference	whether	the	phenomena	described	are	called	“contents”	or	“objects,”	since	they	are	simply	phenomena.	This	is	why,	in	this	context,	the	ontological	implications	of	intentionality	play	no	significant	role	in	the	project	conducted	in	the	Psychology.		 Despite	its	apparent	limitations	and	the	mainly	psychological	motivations	behind	the	basic	theory,	it	has	the	advantage	of	ranging	over	all	mental	phenomena	and	explaining	their	common	core,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	we	sometimes	make	perceptual	errors	or	think	of	objects	which	do	not	exist.	This	advantage	should	not	be	underestimated,	as	it	allows	Brentano	to	offer	an	account	of	the	intentional	nature	of	our	phenomenal	experiences.	What	it’s	like	for	me	to	enjoy	an	ice	cream	is	something	which,	on	the	face	of	it,	does	not	have	much	to	do	with	a	state	of	the	world,	and	yet	it	seems	that	the	experience	of	tasting	an	ice	cream	has	an	intentional	object	which	is	the	content	of	the	experience,	its	phenomenal	features,	which	seem	to	be	distinct	from	the	physical	properties	of	the	dairy	product	perched	on	the	cone	in	my	hand.	This	is	the	gist	of	the	formulation	we	find	in	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	concerning	the	contents	
																																																								





67 Brentano and his early students – Stumpf and Marty – made many attempts in lectures and correspondence to 
account for this fact, particularly through sophisticated conceptions of abstraction. See Fréchette (2015a) and 









68 The lack of comprehensiveness of the enhanced theory also affected his account of truth from the same period, 
which has been characterized recently as a “deflationist account” (Brandl 2017). 
69 This is also why Brentano’s reistic theory is often described as an adverbial theory of intentionality. See 
Chisholm (1957) and Chrudzimski and Smith (2004). 



















72 Brentano (1889/1902, pp. 75-7/pp. 69-71; p. 17/pp. 11-2; 1930/1966, p. 25/pp. 14-5; 1959, p. 169; 
1968, p. 141). 
73 See Mulligan (forthcoming) for this specific account of fittingness exposed by Brentano in 1906. See also 




74 Chisholm (1986, p. 53) uses precisely Brentano’s late theory to show that Brentano’s account of emotion is an 
account of fitting attitudes. We might indeed reword (iiia) in order to keep the fitting relation, for instance by 
saying that an emotion is correct iff “it is appropriate, or fitting, for me to feel this strong pro-attitude toward this 
experience” (see also Feldman and Feldman 2015, and similarly Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). 
Mulligan (forthcoming) makes a convincing case that attributing a fitting attitude theory to the late Brentano is 
“wrong or highly misleading.” The main reason is that Brentano’s late reism aims to reject the relational 
conception of intentionality. Since emotions are intentional acts, it is reasonable to think that their correctness 
should not be considered in relational terms. 
75 Letter from Brentano to Kraus (1916), quoted in Chisholm (1966, pp. 399-400) 




77 See Spiegelberg (1971, p. 66) and (1982, p. 151). A similar affirmation is reported in Føllesdal (1982, p. 53) 
who mentions a discussion he had with Ingarden: “He [Roman Ingarden] told me that he once asked Husserl 










78 This chapter has been written with the support of the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF), Project number P-
27215. Thanks to the editor John Shand for many helpful remarks, to Johannes L. Brandl and Kevin Mulligan 
for written comments on a previous version, and to Paul Reeve for linguistic revision. 
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